I.
Introduction 21.1 (3) The Minister may disclose confidential business information about a therapeutic product without notifying the person to whose business or affairs the information relates or obtaining their consent, if the purpose of the disclosure is related to the protection or promotion of human health or the safety of the public and the disclosure is to… (c) a person who carries out functions relating to the protection or promotion of human health or the safety of the public.
counter to both the express wording and spirit of Vanessa's Law. Specifically, Health
Canada's position that s. 21.1(3)(c) requires those who request information pursuant to this provision to, i. Demonstrate qualifications as a health professional and research expertise; ii.
Enter into a confidentiality agreement; iii.
Agree not to disclose the information to any third parties; and, iv.
Demonstrate prior efforts to obtain the information from alternative sources;
is contrary to the express wording of section 21.1(3)(c), constitutes an ultra vires exercise of statutory authority, substantially undermines the purpose of the provision, viz.
to better protect Canadians from harm, and is fundamentally at odds with the scheme and object of the F&D Act as well as the intention of Parliament in enacting Vanessa's Law. Further, these limitations potentially violate the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
We therefore call upon Health Canada to immediately alter its approach as stated in the Draft Guidance.
[4]
In this brief we show that Health Canada's Draft Guidance improperly "reads in"
four requirements into section 21.1(3)(c), which run counter to the express wording and spirit of Vanessa's Law. We begin by explaining why Health Canada's practice of treating safety and effectiveness data as CBI is mistaken and misguided, fails to recognize an internationally recognized need for a new approach to drug safety, and fails to live up to Vanessa's Law's recognition of the need for new transparency measures.
Then, we describe the legislative background and purpose of Vanessa's Law, and detail the fundamental flaws in Health Canada's Draft Guidance. [5] No Canadian court has ever squarely considered the issue of whether information pertaining to the safety or effectiveness of a drug falls within the scope of "confidential business information", in respect of a person to whose business or affairs the information relates, means -subject to the regulations -business information (a) that is not publicly available, (b) in respect of which the person has taken measures that are reasonable in the circumstances to ensure that it remains not publicly available, and (c) that has actual or potential economic value to the person or their competitors because it is not publicly available and its disclosure would result in a material financial loss to the person or a material financial gain to its competitors; [emphasis added] [7] Despite the broad wording in Vanessa's Law, we submit that any information about a drug's safety or effectiveness should not fall within the codified definition of CBI.
II. Drug Safety and Effectiveness Data Should Not Regarded as CBI
It is clinical information, derived from patients in the course of clinical studies or treatment, intended to contribute to the creation of public knowledge that is crucial for the protection of individual patients and the public at large. On its face, such information is not business information.
[8]
In addition, the definition of CBI in Vanessa's Law stipulates that the information must hold "actual or potential economic value", such that its disclosure "would result in a material financial loss to the person or a material financial gain to its competitors." Canada lacked any such legal requirements and Bill C-17 did not promise to remedy the situation when it was first introduced in Parliament.
[18] This fundamental shortcoming in the proposed legislation was highlighted in the medical literature, the media, and the House of Commons. The federal government responded by amending Bill C-17. Several provisions intended to improve transparency were added during the legislative process. They include a mandatory requirement for drug manufacturers to make "prescribed information" about studies testing a drug's safety and/or effectiveness publicly available (s. 21.71); a power to make regulations requiring the Minister of Health to make "publicly available" decisions "with regard to the issuance, amendment, suspension and revocation of authorizations" to market a drug (s.
30(1.1)(b.1)); and, discretionary powers to disclose "confidential business information" in the event that the "Minister believes that the product may present a serious risk of injury to human health" (s. 21.1(2)), or if the "purpose of the disclosure is related to the protection or promotion of human health or the safety of the public and the disclosure is When I saw the amendments that I was able to present in committee that added a whole clinical trial transparency piece to this bill, I have to tell you, I was thrilled. I didn't know they had them ready, but I know one individual in Health Canada has been working on this bill for 14 years. I'm convinced they will do it right and they'll get the regulations right. But the devil is in the details, and so you look at the intent and the competency of the people.
[21] The transparency related amendments to Bill C-17 were approved by Parliament and given royal assent on November 6, 2014. As testament to the importance of transparency to the enacted legislation's purpose, a third paragraph was integrated into the summary of the legislation:
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2784720 Law. Health Canada has echoed the importance of transparency in numerous news releases and policy documents since the passage of Vanessa's Law. However, the regulator's Draft Guidance has the potential to significantly undermine this objective of improving "oversight of therapeutic products by increasing transparency."
IV. Health Canada's Draft Guidance on Section 21.1(3)(c)
[23] Health Canada's Draft Guidance sets out the parameters regarding how the regulator proposes to utilize the new discretionary power in s. 21.1(3)(c) of the F&D Act.
We focus on four aspects in particular, which stem from sections 3.1(i)-(iii), 3.2, 6 and 8 of the Draft Guidance. For convenience, we reproduce these sections below:
Consistent with the objectives of the Protecting Canadians from Unsafe Drugs Act, information disclosed under this authority should contribute to improving the health of Canadians. Requests for disclosure under this authority should clearly define how the purpose relates to this objective and include a formal plan to use the information to advance knowledge, including making results publicly available. ii.
Use of this authority should be necessary to achieve the purpose for which the information is requested. A decision on whether or not to disclose CBI will include consideration of whether or not all other possible sources of the information, including from the originator of the information, have been exhausted. Only information that is directly related to the purpose set out in the request should be considered for disclosure. iii.
Information disclosed under this authority should be kept confidential and used only for non-commercial purposes. Prior to disclosure, Health Canada requires that potential recipients of CBI sign a legally
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2784720 binding agreement to maintain confidentiality, except as permitted by specific exclusions. Requesters are also required to confirm that the information will not be used for commercial purposes, and to report any activities that could result in a conflict of interest. These requirements are not intended to prevent publication of the results of analyses of the disclosed information.
CONSIDERATIONS -PERSONS TO WHOM CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION (CBI) MAY BE DISCLOSED
Health Canada's decision regarding disclosure of CBI includes an assessment of whether the person to whom the CBI would be disclosed fulfills the Act's requirement that they be a person who carries out functions relating to the protection or promotion of human health or the safety of the public.
Where disclosure of CBI has been requested by an individual, Health Canada expects that the principal requester would have qualifications in a health profession and demonstrated expertise in the subject of the request.
Where disclosure of CBI has been requested by a corporation, Health Canada expects that its corporate mandate, as described in its articles of incorporation or other documentation, would include purposes relevant to the protection or promotion of human health or the safety of the public and the health or safety issue that is the subject of the request. In addition, it is expected that the designated representative of the corporation identified in the request would have qualifications in a health profession and demonstrated expertise in the topic of the research.
An assessment of the qualifications of a requester may include other considerations, including:
• Relevance of the requester's qualifications to the purpose of the proposed disclosure. Requesters should have the necessary expertise to lead the proposed project. Projects requiring specialized technical expertise may involve collaborators, who should be identified at the request stage where possible.
• Record of contribution to improving the health and/or safety of Canadians in an area relevant to the subject of the request. Publications and research projects related to health and safety issues other than the subject of the request may be taken into account in assessing a request.
• Record of disseminating information to advance scientific knowledge for non-commercial purposes. Where the requester is a corporation, its legal status (for-profit, not-for-profit) may be considered in assessing the risk of a conflict of interest.
MAINTAINING CONFIDENTIALITY OF DISCLOSED INFORMATION
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Health Canada requires requesters to sign a legally binding Confidentiality Agreement to maintain the confidentiality of disclosed information. Among other things, this Agreement provides that the disclosed information can be used only for the purposes of the proposed project and must be kept confidential using appropriate safeguards. The Confidentiality Agreement also prohibits reproduction of disclosed information. The Agreement provides exclusions to the confidentiality obligations, such as for information that is in the public domain, received from another source or for information that the originator has consented to be released. The requester is free to publish results of the analysis as long as the confidentiality of the disclosed information is maintained.
REQUIREMENTS FOR PERSONS REQUESTING DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORAMTION UNDER PARAGRAPH 21.1(3)(C)
Health Canada expects that decisions regarding disclosure of CBI under paragraph 21.1(3)(c) will normally be in response to a request from an individual or corporation. For this purpose, Health Canada provides a request form that should be completed by requesters. All requests should include the following information:
• Personal and contact information for the principal requester.
• Professional information for the principal requester, including professional qualifications, employment and relevant research experience.
• Names and positions of project collaborators.
• A description of the information requested, including the therapeutic product and regulatory functions to which the information relates. Requesters are encouraged to consult Health Canada's on-line databases of regulatory information and other resources in order to specify their requests as much as possible.
• Indication that the requester has exhausted other sources of the information requested, including from the originator of the information.
• A project summary that clearly indicates the purpose of the proposed disclosure and how it relates to the protection or promotion of human health or the safety of the public.
• Confirmation that the requested information will not be used for commercial purposes.
If a request is incomplete, a requester may be asked to provide missing information. Where Health Canada's assessment finds that the request meets the requirements of the Act, a requester will be asked to provide additional information required to prepare a recommendation regarding disclosure. This will include:
• A completed Conflict of Interest Declaration that provides information required by Health Canada to assess whether or not the requester's financial interests and other affiliations may conflict with their use of the requested information.
• A signed Confidentiality Agreement with Health Canada that would take effect only if and when Health Canada decides to disclose CBI to the requester.
• A dissemination plan to make the results of the project publicly available.
[emphasis added]
[24]
In effect, the Draft Guidance proposes to limit the scope of s. 21.1(3)(c) of the F&D Act to individuals that are, i. recognized health professionals who intend to use the requested CBI in a specific research project, and who are also willing to: ii.
sign a "legally binding Confidentiality Agreement"; iii.
agree not to reproduce, in whole or in part, the disclosed information; and, iv.
demonstrate a priori that they have "exhausted other sources of the information requested, including from the originator of the information."
[25] These four limitations have no basis in law and sound policy-making. Below, we
show that limiting the application of s. 21.1(3)(c) to those circumstances is contrary to the express wording of the provision and the purpose of Vanessa's Law, confers to the Minister powers that Parliament did not grant, and undermines the efficacy of a regulatory framework in achieving its public interest oriented goals. The barriers it creates to an effective sharing of data are so significant that it undermines the very purpose of the F&D Act's transparency provisions. (ii) the use of confidentiality agreements, (iii) limitations upon subsequent disclosure of the information, or (iv) a need to attempt to secure access to the information in question from other sources before making a request under section 21.1(3)(c). Indeed, the pharmaceutical industry was at pains to highlight the very omission of requirements such as (ii) or (iii) from the legislation when providing testimony before the Standing Senate
V. The Draft Guidance's Imposition of Four Limitations on Disclosure is
Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology on Bill C-17:
Both the lowered threshold for the release of CBI and the lack of provisions holding recipients of CBI to respect that confidentiality are at odds with the practices of our major trading partners. These provisions are also at odds with the principles underlying the Regulatory Cooperation Council, established by the Canadian and U.S. governments. [28] To the extent that the Draft Guidance document imposes new obligations on those requesting access to data that Parliament did not explicitly empower the Minister to impose, the Draft Guidance is also ultra vires. The only discretionary power granted to the Minister under Vanessa's Law is the power to determine whether the purpose of the disclosure is "related to the protection or promotion of human health or the safety of the public" and whether the disclosure is to a qualified person. These are the only explicit conditions for the exercise of the discretionary power mentioned under the F&D Act. Yet, the Draft Guidance imposes at least two inter-related new obligations to requesters of information: to sign a confidentiality agreement and thus to keep the data confidential, and not to reproduce the information, in whole or in part, to third parties.
[29] These two new obligations go beyond what Parliament authorized when enacting Vanessa's Law. Indeed, the legislation explicitly allows the Minister to disclose data for public health and safety purposes. When exercising that discretionary power, the data ceases to constitute CBI, assuming it was properly categorized as such in the first place.
Thus, the imposition of a confidentiality obligation and the imposition of an obligation not to further share data not only have no statutory basis, they are also in contradiction with the power granted to the Minister. Nothing in the statute empowers the Minister to create an exclusive right over the use of that information. The statute's granting of power to enact further regulations or guidance documents in relation to the disclosure is not a sufficient basis to create specific conditions that are not mentioned under the F&D Act.
[30] Recent jurisprudence supports this conclusion. The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that jurisdiction-granting provisions are not analogous to general regulation or policy making because the former are express grants of specific authority from Parliament while the latter must be interpreted so as not to confer unfettered discretion not contemplated by the jurisdiction-granting provisions of the legislation (Reference re Broadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 2010 -167 and Broadcasting Order CRTC 2010 -168, [2012 3 S.C.R. 489 at para. 27). Thus, the power to enact further regulations or guidance documents cannot serve to broaden the discretion Parliament saw fit to confer upon the Minister in s. 21.1(3)(c).
[31] More generally, the power to enact regulations and implement a regulatory [32] In our view, these new obligations are also neither essential nor sufficiently related to the purpose of Vanessa's Act to support a claim that these conditions have to be read into the legislation. The doctrine of jurisdiction by necessary implication, even if applicable, can only justify measures that are directly related to the purpose of the regulatory framework, i.e. the protection of the health and safety of Canadians. The obligations imposed are in fact contrary to the purpose of the regulatory framework, as
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[33]
As we indicated at the outset, reading in these four limitations is also more generally irreconcilable with the "scheme of the Act, the object of the Act and the intention of Parliament" and therefore not a reasonable exercise of Health Canada's regulatory role. Below, we expand on why they are fundamentally at odds with the scheme and object of the F&D Act as well as the intention of Parliament. [35] The effect of the Draft Guidance is to unlawfully fetter the Minister's broad discretion to disclose information to persons who carry out functions relating to the protection or promotion of human health or the safety of the public. It is trite law that a non-statutory instrument cannot pre-empt the exercise of a regulator's discretion in a particular case, such as where the requester fails to meet one of the four conditions set out in the Draft Guidance.
i. Limiting Persons Eligible to Make a Request to Health Professionals with Research Expertise Runs Counter to the Purpose of Vanessa's Law
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[38] The Draft Guidance's proposed limitation upon who fits within the category of persons that perform functions that protect or promote human health or public safety is thus impossible to square with the express wording and purpose of the provision.
ii. Requiring a Confidentiality Agreement Runs Counter to the Purpose of Vanessa's Law
[39] Health Canada's decision to require those who seek CBI pursuant to s. 21.1(3)(c)
to sign a confidentiality agreement appears to follow from the nature of the information involved. That is, Health Canada has reasoned that because CBI is involved, it should only be shared with eligible persons under conditions of confidentiality.
[40] However, this reasoning does not follow when considered in light of Canada's international obligations, relevant caselaw regarding the scope of Minister's authority when exercising a statutory power, much less the scheme and object of the F&D Act or the intention of Parliament.
[41] First, despite the regulator's longstanding practice of doing so and industry's inaccurate contention that the regulator must do so, Health Canada is under no absolute international obligation to maintain the confidentiality of information that it receives from drug manufacturers. Rather, existing international treaties require that Health Canada protect data that it receives in confidence against "unfair commercial use." (North Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2784720
[49] Health Canada's Draft Guidance, which purports to impose a legal obligation of confidentiality upon those who request CBI pursuant to s. 21.1(3)(c), is fundamentally at odds with the scheme and object of the F&D Act and Parliament's intention. In enacting s. s. 21.1(3)(c) as well as other amendments designed to improve transparency (see ss.
21.1(2), 21.4(2), 21.71), Parliament chose to break from past practice of keeping information confidential given the public health risks of continued secrecy. Health
Canada's Draft Guidance attempt to continue its practice of confidentiality is thus inconsistent with the will of Parliament.
iii. Precluding Disclosure of Information to Third Parties for the Purpose of Protecting or Promoting Human Health or Public Safety Runs Counter to the Purpose of Vanessa's Law
[50] Maintaining the confidentiality of CBI is at odds with Parliament's intention not only because it purports to continue the regulator's past practice of secrecy, but also because it will undermine the express goal of s. 21.1(3)(c). Parliament recognized that persons who protect human health or public safety will be assisted in doing so when given access to pharmaceutical CBI. However, Health Canada's Draft Guidance threatens that very task in additional ways.
[51] In particular, Health Canada's Draft Guidance precludes persons that are otherwise eligible to receive CBI from reproducing, in whole or in part, that same CBI.
The Draft Guidance does allow such persons to disseminate "results", for example, where the CBI is analyzed for research purposes. But they are prohibited from sharing the information from which those results are derived.
[52] This may appear to strike a reasonable balance, however, the dissemination of Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2784720
<http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=18998>.) Precluding those who access CBI pursuant to s. 21.1(3)(c) from sharing that information will thus limit their ability to disseminate their findings through reputable journals-one of the most important avenues of communication within the biomedical community, amongst all health professionals, to patients, and the public at large.
[53] More fundamentally, it is impossible to detect selective reporting and outright fabrication of results without data openness, to the detriment of public health. [54] By reading in a limitation of disclosing only the results of any research or analysis carried out with information shared under s. 21.1(3)(c), Health Canada's Draft Guidance is in fact more apt to undermine, rather than serve, the goal of protecting and promoting human health or public safety.
iv. Demonstrating Other Sources of Information have been Exhausted Runs Counter to the Purpose of Vanessa's Law
[55] Section 8 of the Draft Guidance stipulates in part that requests made under s.
21.1(3)(c) should provide an "indication that the requester has exhausted other sources of the information requested, including from the originator of the information." In addition, listed amongst the Guiding Principles in s. 3.1 of the Draft Guidance is the following:
Use of this authority should be necessary to achieve the purpose for which the information is requested. A decision on whether or not to disclose CBI will include consideration of whether or not all other possible sources of the Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2784720 information, including from the originator of the information, have been exhausted. Only information that is directly related to the purpose set out in the request should be considered for disclosure. However, requiring putative requesters to attempt to secure information from such sources betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of why access to CBI stands to help protect and promote human health.
[57]
In short, there is no guarantee that any source of information is the same. In some documented cases, pharmaceutical companies have misled regulators, providing only some of the information pertaining to a given drug. Therefore, to ensure that regulators are able to make informed decisions, it is essential to have access to the information they hold regardless of whether access can be secured from other sources.
[58] Further, the originators of the of information (i.e. pharmaceutical companies)
have an incentive to appear as though they are transparent in the public eye while in practice working to delay and complicate researchers' access to, and analysis of, the information, particularly where the purpose of the research is interrogate past findings that support a drug on the market. This is precisely what occurred in the paroxetine case. The originator, GlaxoSmithKline, ultimately provided access to the data in question. But they did so slowly and in a manner that was far from conducive to analysis; the researchers involved had to scrutinize thousands of pages of data in 'read only' format on a company computer. (Doshi, P., "Putting GlaxoSmithKline to the test over paroxetine" (2013) 347:nov12 2 BMJ f6754; Noury et al., supra.) The obligation to try to obtain data from all other possible sources will thus delay access to data and create an often insurmountable practical burden for health researchers and others.
[59] Introducing this procedural hurdle into s. 21.1(3)(c) of the F&D Act is also eerily similar to what prevented "Canada's Access to Medicine Regime" (CAMR) from
achieving its core purpose. CAMR was a law that was intended to facilitate access to essential medicines in less developed countries. However, amongst other requirements, Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2784720
[61] Parliament recognized as much by adding to the summary of the legislation the following statement of purpose: to "promote greater confidence in the oversight of therapeutic products by increasing transparency."
[62]
In accordance with this generous and purposive approach, an activity by which one conveys or attempts to convey meaning will prima facie be protected by s. 2(b) (Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General) , [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at pp. 968-69 and
Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority at para. 27). In addition, it has long been recognized that s. 2 (b) protects the right to receive as well as broadcast expression (Vancouver Sun at para. 26, and Baier v. Alberta, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 673 at para. 40).
[63]
In our view, requesters are entitled to express themselves by publishing their research and speaking to patients, colleagues and the media regarding the risks and benefits of drugs; they are further entitled to obtain and use information that may be relevant or even essential to protect and promote one's health (and thus, as discussed below, the right to life and security of the person).
[64]
In this respect, we emphasize that s. 2(b) protects not only the right of requesters, but also the right of the public, to receive information regarding the safety and effectiveness of drugs. Much like the press plays a vital role in being the conduit through which the public receives information regarding the operation of public institutions (Edmonton Journal at pp. 1339-40), so too eligible persons play a vital role in accessing, analyzing and interpreting safety and effectiveness data for the broader public.
[65] It matters not, in our view, whether the right sought is described as positive or [66] Access to documents in government hands may be constitutionally protected where it is shown to be a necessary precondition of meaningful expression, provided that, as here, it does not encroach on protected privileges and is compatible with the oversight of therapeutic products by the Minister (see Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v. Criminal Lawyers' Association, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 815 at para. 5). For our purposes, it is sufficient that eligible persons cannot research without the data and that they cannot publish in a number of journals without disclosing the data. As set out below, there are also the rights of individuals using, or considering using, therapeutic products to consider. requires that the citizenry be granted access to government records when it is necessary to meaningful public debate on the conduct of government institutions." So too, access to drug data is necessary to meaningful public debate relating to the safety and effectiveness of therapeutic products such as Vioxx and Paxil. In both those cases, the disclosure of information known to the drug manufacturer and, at least in the case of Vioxx, to the regulator, may have brought safety concerns about their use to light and saved the lives of Canadians.
[68] While requesters and the public at large may have a constitutional right of access to drug data, our primary concern is removing a barrier to expression. In this case, would-be requesters may be eligible for disclosure, but would be nonetheless excluded
in the event they refused to maintain the data confidential and omit drug data from their research publications. As in Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority, supra these requesters would be rejected, not on the basis that access to drug data is unavailable to them, but rather because of their refusal to enter into a confidentiality agreement that limits the content of their research publications. Would-be requesters should, in our view, be entitled to receive information and to express themselves without undue state interference with the content of their expression.
[ violated by a legislative prohibition on private insurance, because it prevented individuals from taking out their own insurance in order to obtain timely access to health care.
Preventing access to and public discussion of relevant health information held by the government also appears to seriously hinder people's ability to make decisions in relation to their health and physical integrity.
[71] The right to life and security of the person is at stake because access to clinical data held by Health Canada is crucial to be properly informed for decisions that relate to people's health and physical integrity. As some of the controversies mentioned before indicate, independent analysis of data has in several instances resulted in the discovery of significant safety and efficacy problems related to pharmaceutical products. Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized the importance of access to information held by governmental agencies to enable people to make decisions in relation to their health and
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We would like to point out also the link that can exist between the protection of freedom of expression and the right to life and security of the person. The restrictions imposed by the Draft Guidance also make it impossible for others, including media outlets, to fulfill their important role in participating in democratic debate about issues of public important, in this case the health and wellbeing of Canadians. In the context of safety of pharmaceutical products and freedom of expression arguments, the European
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VII. Conclusion
[74]
We have argued here that Health Canada's Draft Guidance imposes duties and liabilities on the recipients of clinical data, which have no basis in the legislation that explicitly enables Health Canada to disclose information. To the extent that the restrictions impose a duty to sign a confidentiality agreement and prevent those receiving the information from Health Canada to disclose the data to third parties, they exceed the power granted by Parliament. Furthermore, we argued that several limitations imposed on the disclosure of data are at odds with the purpose of the amendments and the rest of the statutory scheme. Some significantly delay access to data, others create significant difficulties that hinder a proper research use of het data, and still others make a useful sharing and publication of the data hard if not impossible, thus frustrating the purpose of Vanessa's Law of improving the safety of pharmaceuticals and the protection of the public.
[75]
We further argued that the restrictions embedded in the Draft Guidance may also infringe the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, more specifically s. 2(b) and s. 7. To the extent that these restrictions hinder a proper research use and public sharing of research results, they infringe researchers' freedom of expression. The Draft Guidance makes proper sharing of data in the context of research, and the subsequent public debate of
these research findings unjustifiable difficult. We also put forward that the barriers to proper sharing of data make it excessively difficult for individuals to obtain important health related data to inform their own health care related decision. To the extent that they hinder individuals from obtaining relevant information about the risks to their health and physical wellbeing, they also infringe the right to life and security of the person. We pointed out that this connection to the right to be properly informed of relevant health risks and the right to life and security of the person has already been recognized in other jurisdictions and in the context of related fundamental rights provisions.
[76]
We also reiterated in this memorandum our objection to Health Canada's characterisation of clinical data as CBI. Indeed, most of the problems of the Draft Guidance stem from this overly broad characterisation of CBI. We put forward that clinical data should in principle not be considered CBI. We urge Health Canada to follow the lead of the European Medicines Agency and to explicitly recognize that clinical data are in principle not CBI, and that those insisting on data secrecy have to provide evidence of the CBI nature of the data, and of the need for continued confidentiality of the data.
[77] It is worth noting that in the context of the development of its 2014 data sharing policy, the EMA originally also created significant barriers to the proper research use of clinical data even though it did not characterize the data as CBI. Faced with criticism on how its original draft policy was making it excessively cumbersome for researchers and health care advocates to conduct proper public health oriented research, the EMA significantly changed its policy and restored its stated commitment to data transparency.
Health Canada has received the power from Parliament to promote public health and safety through data sharing. We urge Health Canada to use this power wisely and responsibly. To that end, we call upon Health Canada to remove the four limitations we identify above from the Draft Guidance regarding s. 21.1(3)(c) of the F&D Act.
